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I.  THE RHETORIC OF CRISIS 
Over the course of the twentieth century the organized bar spent 
most of its regulatory energy chasing after lawyers who dared to 
advertise and lawyers and laypersons who were engaged in various 
forms of what the bar defined as unauthorized practice of law.1  
Combined with minimum fee schedules, “treaties” with other 
professional service providers delimiting areas of non-competition, 
mandatory examination and licensing by state bars, and moral 
character review for admission to practice, the bar’s restrictions on 
advertising and unauthorized practice implemented a very specific 
idea of professionalism.  Although actual professional misconduct in 
the service of clients was an indirect object of concern, by any 
measure it received relatively little attention from the bench and bar.2  
 
∗ Sweitzer Professor of Law, Stanford Law School.  © 2012 Norman W. Spaulding.  I 
am grateful to Rebecca Maurer for excellent assistance with research.    
 1. See RICHARD ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1991); JEROLD S. AUERBACH, 
UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976). 
 2. See ABA COMM’N ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, 
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES LAWYER REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY, 
x–xii, 1–34 (1992); ABA COMM’N ON PROFESSIONS, IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE: 
A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 63–64 (1986); 
ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT—FINAL DRAFT (1970); 
RICHARD ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE DOCK: LEARNING FROM ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY 
PROCEEDINGS (2008); RICHARD ABEL, LAWYERS ON TRIAL: UNDERSTANDING 
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Pro bono service and other means of ensuring that middle- and low-
income Americans had access to the legal system were even lower 
priorities.3 
Toward the end of the century, courts, commentators and 
legislators sniffed out the protectionism latent in the bar’s concept of 
professionalism and began to dismantle its associated regulatory 
structure.  Post-functionalist sociologists documented the yawning 
gap between the profession’s lofty, service-oriented ideals and its 
lucrative regulatory practices.4  The Supreme Court struck down 
restrictions on certain kinds of advertising and solicitation by lawyers 
as inconsistent with the First Amendment;5 it struck down minimum 
fee schedules on the theory that the practice of law is indeed 
“commerce” under the Sherman Act;6 it struck down certain state 
residency restrictions on law practice;7 it recognized basic 
constitutional limits on the use of moral character review to 
arbitrarily exclude qualified candidates for admission to practice;8 it 
imposed constraints on the use of member dues for political action by 
state bar associations;9 and it recognized the right of lawyers to work 
in concert with public interest organizations and labor unions to 
 
ETHICAL MISCONDUCT (2011); Timothy K. McPike & Mark I. Harrison, Lawyer 
Discipline Since 1970, in ABA/ALI COMM. ON CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL 
EDUCATION, LAW PRACTICE QUALITY EVALUATION 197–98 (1987); Deborah L. 
Rhode, Institutionalizing Legal Ethics, 44 CASE W. L. REV. 665 (1994). 
 3. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2005); DEBORAH L. RHODE, 
PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE: PUBLIC SERVICE AND THE PROFESSIONS 
(2005); David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary, 91 CAL. L. REV. 209 (2003). 
 4. See ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE 
DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR (1988); ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL POWERS: A 
STUDY OF THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF FORMAL KNOWLEDGE (1986); ROBERT 
NELSON & DAVID TRUBEK, LAWYERS’ IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES: 
TRANSFORMATION IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION (1992); Richard L. Abel, 
United States: The Contradictions of Professionalism, in LAWYERS AND SOCIETY: 
THE COMMON LAW WORLD VOL. 1, 186–243 (Abel & Lewis eds., 1989); Ivan Illich, 
Disabling Professions, in IVAN ILLICH ET AL., DISABLING PROFESSIONS 11–40 (1977); 
Talcott Parsons, The Professions and Social Structure, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL 
THEORY (Parsons ed., 1958). 
 5. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); cf. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar 
Assn., 436 U.S. 447 (1978); see also Nora Freeman Engstrom, Attorney Advertising 
and the Contingency Fee Cost Paradox, 65 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
 6. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
 7. Sup. Ct. of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59 (1988); Sup. Ct. of N.H. v. Piper, 470 
U.S. 637 (1985). 
 8. Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of N.M., 353 U.S. 232 (1957). 
 9. Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990). 
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expand access to legal services.10  At the state level, patently 
overbroad unauthorized practice laws were occasionally revisited by 
state legislatures and challenged on First Amendment grounds in the 
courts.11  While there has been little, if any, movement in recent 
decades to improve access to legal services,12 courts began to address 
professional misconduct in the service of clients by recognizing (albeit 
without much palpable enthusiasm) malpractice claims against 
lawyers in civil practice13 and ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
under the Sixth Amendment against criminal lawyers.14 
It is perhaps no accident that the anti-protectionist developments 
of the last four decades coincide with pitched expressions of anxiety 
by elite members of the bar about a “crisis” of professionalism.15  As 
the bar has been forced to release some of its control over 
competition for legal services, frustration with the new demands of 
competition has been expressed as anxiety over declining standards of 
professionalism, increasing commercialization, and the legal 
 
 10. United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United Mine 
Workers v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. 
Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 
(1963). 
 11. See Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., No. Civ. A. 
3:97CV-2859H, 1999 WL 47235 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 1999), vacated, 179 F.3d 956 (5th 
Cir. 1999) (per curiam); Cultum v. Heritage House Realtors, Inc., 694 P.2d 630 
(Wash. 1985) (en banc); Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A 
Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981).  
 12. Significant federal subsidies created in the 1970s have all but disappeared and 
the movement to make pro bono service mandatory failed. See Luban, supra note 3, 
at 211–12. 
 13. See ABA PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS (2008); RONALD E. 
MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE (2009); Gary N. Schumann & 
Scott B. Herlihy, The Impending Wave of Legal Malpractice Litigation—Predictions, 
Analysis, and Proposals for Change, 30 ST. MARY’S L.J. 143 (1998).   
 14. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); cf. Siverson v. O’Leary, 
764 F.2d 1208 (7th Cir. 1985); Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1984); 
Robert R. Rigg, The T-Rex Without Teeth: Evolving Strickland v. Washington and 
the Test for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 77 (2007). 
 15. See ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONALISM, “....IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC 
SERVICE:” A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 1 
(1986), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/ 
cpr/professionalism/Stanley_Commission_Report.authcheckdam.pdf (“Has our 
profession abandoned principle for profit, professionalism for commercialism?”); A 
National Action Plan on Lawyer Conduct and Professionalism, CONFERENCE OF 
CHIEF JUSTICES (Aug. 2, 2001), http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/impl_plan.pdf (citing a 
resolution for a National Study and Action Plan by the Conference of Chief Justices 
in 1996 as noting a decline in professionalism); see also ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE 
LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993). 
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profession’s corresponding loss of prestige in the public eye.16  
Examples of actual misconduct in the service of clients, which had 
never really been a priority in twentieth century professional 
regulation, were suddenly invoked as proof of this crisis.17 
In fact, the rhetoric of crisis may be inherent in the concept of 
professionalism to which elite American lawyers have been attached.  
There is, to begin with, Rayman Solomon’s argument that elites in the 
legal profession experienced “crises” in professionalism almost 
continuously over the course of the twentieth century—even through 
decades in which the protectionist regulatory project appeared 
unimpeachable.18  Expert “[k]nowledge and autonomy are the 
cornerstones of this elite construction of the profession and their 
development and preservation are the defining characteristics of the 
rhetoric of being a professional.  Bar leaders,” he summarizes, 
regularly “invoke the concept of professionalism to lament the 
decline of some aspect of this normative universe and to exhort their 
audience to reestablish the norms.”19  He goes on to examine five 
separate periods in which elite twentieth century lawyers adopted the 
rhetoric of decline, lamentation, and exhortation in response to 
perceived crises in professionalism. 
There is also, as Burton Bledstein has carefully documented, a 
remarkably persistent, distinctively middle-Victorian set of values, 
dispositions, and class consciousness that seems to preclude any deep 
feeling of security among lawyers (and perhaps all professionals) even 
as the size and profitability of the profession expands.  According to 
Bledstein, the professional not only “mastered an esoteric but useful 
body of systematic knowledge,” “completed theoretical training,” 
“received a degree or license from a recognized institution,”20 and 
“embraced an ethic of service” in which “dedication to a client’s 
interest took precedence over personal profit,”21 the professional also 
relied upon a constant dissemination of symbols to “emphasize[] 
 
 16. See sources cited supra note 15. 
 17. DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 956 (4th ed. 2004) 
(citing data on the tiny number of public sanctions imposed relative to grievances 
filed); PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE 2004-2007, ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON 
LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY. 
 18. Rayman L. Solomon, Five Crises or One: The Concept of Legal 
Professionalism, 1925-1960, in NELSON & TRUBEK, supra note 4, at 144. 
 19. Id. at 148. 
 20. BURTON J. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM: THE MIDDLE 
CLASS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA 86–87 (1976). 
 21. Id. at 87. 
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professional authority.”22  These symbols included “[d]egrees, 
diplomas, and honorary awards . . . on the office walls of a certified 
practitioner;”23 the lawyer’s “‘casebooks’ and legal library;”24 “the 
number of technical aids in an office, the number of articles and 
books on a vita, [and] the income and lifestyle of a successful 
practitioner.”25  The effect was to draw into relief “the complexity of a 
subject, its forbidding nature to the layman, the uninitiated, and even 
the inexperienced practitioner.”26  Appreciation of complexity 
correspondingly “reinforced the public’s consciousness of its 
dependence” upon the professional.27 
But if the “culture of professionalism tended to cultivate an 
atmosphere of constant crisis—emergency—in which practitioners 
both created work for themselves and reinforced their authority by 
intimidating clients,”28 it also filled professionals with anxiety about 
the fragility and hypocrisy of that symbolic project.  Work ostensibly 
grounded in esoteric knowledge was at peril of being exposed as 
pedestrian and routine rather than complex, or, worse still, mere 
charlatanism.29  And the exercise of ostensibly independent judgment 
on behalf of clients in the name of service could be exposed as 
tendentious or debased by the compensation received, by excessive 
fidelity to the client’s cause, and by injury to the public interest and 
the rule of law.30  Even professional authority grounded in genuinely 
 
 22. Id. at 95. 
 23. Id. at 95. 
 24. Id. at 96. 
 25. Id. at 99.  For legal professionals, the courthouse itself also operated as a 
crucial symbol of authority. See Norman W. Spaulding, The Enclosure of Justice: 
Courthouse Architecture, Due Process, and the Dead Metaphor of Trial, 24 YALE 
J.L. & HUMAN. 311 (2012). 
 26. BLEDSTEIN, supra note 20, at 98. 
 27. Id. at 99.  A welter of post-functionalist sociological research on the 
professions in the latter half of the twentieth century confirms that Bledstein’s thesis 
is relevant to the modern professions.  As Ivan Illich acidly concludes, “Professionals 
tell you what you need and claim the power to prescribe . . . .  Neither income, long 
training, delicate tasks, nor social standing is the mark of the professional.  Rather, it 
is his authority to define a person as a client, to determine that person’s need and to 
hand the person a prescription.” Illich, supra note 4, at 16–17; see also ABBOTT, supra 
note 4; FREIDSON, supra note 4; NELSON & TRUBEK, supra note 4; Richard L. Abel, 
United States: The Contradictions of Professionalism, in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE 
COMMON LAW WORLD 186 (Richard L. Abel and Philip S.C. Lewis eds, 1988).  
 28. BLEDSTEIN, supra note 20, at 100. 
 29. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).  
 30. Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988); 
Robert W. Gordon, The Ideal and the Actual in the Law: Fantasies and Practices of 
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expert and independent judgment was open to attack for creating a 
form of dependence on elites inconsistent with democratic access to 
law.31  This critique was central to populist Jacksonian calls to abolish 
restrictions on admission to the practice of law and to codify law by 
legislation.32  Common law adjudication was not only expensive and 
impenetrably complex, it placed stewardship of the rule of law in the 
hands of lawyers and the least democratic branch.33 
Finally, even as the culture of professionalism “bred public 
attitudes of submission and passivity” among professionals, it 
cultivated “a vertical vision that compelled persons to look upward.”34  
In that upward gaze, a successful career is chronically unstable—the 
highest and defining accomplishment always a future feat.  As 
Bledstein vividly describes: 
Career meant scheduled mobility, from the distinct and ascending 
levels of schooling, to the distinct and ascending levels of 
occupational responsibility and prestige. . . .  Horizontally the 
careerist “boomed,” fought, energetically competed, wasted the 
obstacles in the way, and overcame all impediments, especially his 
own inertia.  Vertically he escalated, mounting the successive 
platforms of achievement.35 
For the professionals who shared this “vertically oriented” disposition 
the terror of failure, of being unmasked, and above all, of falling, was 
ever present.  “The fear of falling gnawed away at every climber, and 
this fear—ubiquitous in the middle class—was often the source of a 
general anxiety within individuals which no amount of monetary 
security, public honors, or personal confidence seemed to 
eliminate.”36 
Against this history it is difficult to read Julius Henry Cohen’s 
exhortations about professionalism, the imperative of professional 
organization, and the objectives of professional discipline in his 1916 
book, The Law: Business or Profession?, as more than a prologue to 
 
New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-
CIVIL WAR AMERICA (Gerald W. Gawalt ed., 1983). 
 31. CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF 
ANTEBELLUM REFORM (1981); Norman W. Spaulding, The Luxury of the Law: The 
Codification Movement and the Right to Counsel, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 983 (2004).  
 32. See COOK, supra note 31, at 158–63; Spaulding, supra note 31, at 988–90.  
 33. See COOK, supra note 31, at 158–63; Spaulding, supra note 31, at 985–86.  
 34. BLEDSTEIN, supra note 20, at 104–05. 
 35. Id. at 111–12. 
 36. Id. at 106.  Bledstein notes that “[a]dvice literature on the fragile nature of 
success proliferated in America after 1840, and the fear of failure was evident 
throughout.” Id. at 106 n.38. 
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the bar’s discredited regulatory venture in the twentieth century.37  A 
prologue delivered in the rhetoric and defined by the mid-Victorian 
values of elite lawyers who had reacted so vehemently to the leveling 
spirit and policies of Jacksonian populism in the nineteenth century.  
But even if Cohen’s call for more formal professional organization 
and regulation fits well within a trajectory rooted in the ideology of 
elite antebellum Whig-Federalists who set the foundation for the 
adoption of mid-Victorian values among American lawyers, and 
extending forward to the bar’s twentieth century protectionism and 
management of various “crises” of professionalism, it is in other 
important respects utterly anachronistic.  Indeed, the bar and its 
critics remain, to this day, caught in a paralyzing anachronism that 
reflects fundamental misunderstandings of what the practice of law is. 
In this Article, I begin by briefly describing how Cohen’s work fits 
within the trajectory of professional ideology and organization for 
American lawyers.38  I then demonstrate the anachronism of the 
twentieth century bar’s professionalism project.  I conclude by 
offering some observations about alternative ideas of professionalism 
to guide regulation of the legal profession in the twenty-first century.39 
II.  THE RHETORIC OF COMMERCIAL DEGENERATION 
The basic themes of The Law: Business or Profession? are familiar 
to any student of the history of the legal profession.  Nostalgia for the 
supposedly more tame, dignified, gentlemanly mores of the past is 
mixed with handwringing about public anti-lawyer sentiment, 
increased commercialization, and lax standards of admission and 
discipline reducing the character, ethics, manners, and quality of the 
bar.40  Sidney George Fisher, a Whig lawyer, author, and farmer from 
Pennsylvania, expressed remarkably similar sentiments in an 1869 
diary entry.  “The practice of law,” he lamented, 
 
 37. JULIUS HENRY COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? (1916). 
 38. Samuel Levine has quite ably demonstrated how influential Cohen’s ideas 
were among elites in the twentieth century bar. See Samuel J. Levine, Rediscovering 
Julius Henry Cohen and the Origins of the Business/Profession Dichotomy: A Study 
in the Discourse of Early Twentieth Century Legal Professionalism, 47 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 1 (2005). 
 39. My reading is not grounded in Cohen’s biography, which, by all the evidence, 
suggests that he admirably embodied the ethic of service that was espoused by many 
elite lawyers searching for ways to mediate the contradictions of the profession’s 
ideals at the time. See Gordon, supra note 30, at 51, 61.   
 40. See infra Part II. 
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has become little better than a mere trade under the degrading 
influence of democracy.  It by no means follows that a successful 
lawyer is a gentleman, that he is a man of honor, or that he has 
received a liberal education; and indeed those who are now most 
successful at making money, the great object of all, are notoriously 
deficient in these qualities, which were once regarded as 
prerequisites. 
The bar and the bench, too, have fallen very far below the dignified 
and respectable position it held when I knew it thirty years ago.  I 
saw and knew the last of the old set who gave so much influence and 
reputation—Rawle, Binney, Sergeant, Chauncey, the two Ingersolls, 
Scott, etc.—all of them gentlemen by culture, birth and manners, all 
of them distinguished for their learning and ability, Binney and 
Sergeant pre-eminent for eloquence and power, all of them too, with 
scarcely an exception, worthy of all confidence and respect for 
integrity, professional honor, and moral worth.  The courtroom, in 
those days, every morning when the bar was assembled, was like a 
drawing room, filled with elegantly dressed gentlemen of courtly and 
refined manners. 
Many a times have I gone to hear Binney or Sergeant speak and to 
enjoy the conversation of these men, for they were very gracious and 
kind to young members of the profession; and I always remember 
their courtesy to me with pleasure, whether, when I met them in 
Court, or enjoyed, as I constantly did, the hospitality of their homes.  
All of this is now changed—culture, elegance, refinement, courtesy, 
eloquence, wit, scholarship have vanished.41 
To be fair, Fisher hated the practice of law almost from the very 
beginning of his career—he longed to succeed as a gentleman of 
letters—but similar sentiments can be found among early American 
lawyers who were not malcontents.42  Crucially, the supposed 
commercial degeneration of the bar was also central to populist 
critiques in the antebellum period.  “Gain,” P.W. Grayson 
 
 41. SIDNEY GEORGE FISHER, A PHILADELPHIA PERSPECTIVE: THE DIARY OF 
SIDNEY GEORGE FISHER COVERING THE YEARS 1834-1871, at 553 (1967) (emphasis 
added) (diary entry of Sept. 18, 1869); see also COHEN, supra note 37, at 105–06 
(quoting Sharswood on the decline of the Roman legal profession). 
 42. A PHILADELPHIA PERSPECTIVE: THE CIVIL WAR DIARY OF SIDNEY GEORGE 
FISHER (Jonathan W. White ed., 2007).  For similar expressions by antebellum 
lawyers see Diary and Autobiography of John Adams, in 1 THE ADAMS PAPERS 
(L.H. Butterfield ed., 1962); Amalia Kessler, Civic Republicanism and the Cultural 
Foundations of American Adversarialism: Henry Vanderlyn and the Decline of 
Equity’s Quasi-Inquisitorial Tradition, Faculty Workshop Presentation, Stanford 
Law School (Apr. 20, 2011) (on file with author). 
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complained in 1830, is the “animating principle” of the bar.43  “Eager 
for employment, they pry into the business of men, with snakish 
smoothness slip into the secrets of their affairs, discern the 
ingredients of litigation, and blow them up into strife.  This is, indeed, 
but laboring in their vocation.”44 
Cohen, for his part, devotes several chapters to comparative 
evidence running back to the classical period to establish that law was 
everywhere regarded as more than a mere trade concerned with 
profit.45  But his core argument picks up in the spirit of Fisher’s 
lamentation, emphasizing “[t]he degree to which our profession has 
been commercialized since the Civil War”46 and blaming the 
antebellum populist movement for this decline—what Fisher called 
“the degrading influence of democracy.”47  “An untrained, an 
uneducated, an unlicensed and an unregulated bar,” Cohen insists, 
“thrives upon pettifogging, bribery, and corruption. It pollutes the 
stream of justice and brings down contempt upon the profession.”48  It 
privileges “the current standard of the market place,—‘Profits 
first.’”49  It “touts” and solicits and advertises and chases after the 
misfortune of others and gambles on the outcomes of cases.50  It 
enters corrupt combinations to bring litigation rather than suffering 
 
 43. P.W. Grayson, Vice Unmasked, an Essay: Being a Consideration of the 
Influence of Law Upon the Moral Essence of Man, With Other Reflections, in THE 
LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE CIVIL WAR 194–95 (Perry 
Miller ed., 1962).   
 44. Id. at 194–95; see IN DEBT TO SHAYS: THE BICENTENNIAL OF AN AGRARIAN 
REBELLION (Robert A. Gross ed., 1993); see also MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, 
AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY (1976); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1973) (on populist anti-lawyer sentiment); DAVID 
SZATMARY, SHAYS’ REBELLION: THE MAKING OF AN AGRARIAN INSURRECTION 
(1980).   
 45. COHEN, supra note 37, at 44–98. 
 46. Id. at 106. 
 47. FISHER, supra note 41, at 553; see, e.g., COHEN, supra note 37, at 105 (noting 
that the post Civil War generation “has never had to make sacrifices for the State”); 
id. at 115–17 (discussing the Jacksonian populist movement to abolish restrictions on 
entry to practice); id. at 247 (same); id. at 146 (describing nineteenth century 
American lawyers as having “failed to train ourselves properly for our true place in 
society”); id. at 157 (describing the bar of 1830-1850 as “barren of inspiring ideals”); 
id. at 102 (“An untrained, an uneducated, an unlicensed and an unregulated bar 
thrives upon pettifogging, bribery, and corruption.”). 
 48. Id. at 102, 215.  Cohen is not totally indifferent to evidence that even elite 
lawyers had been “led astray, like our clients, by ‘the chase for the dollar.’” Id. at 105. 
 49. Id. at 243. 
 50. Id. at 209 (contingent fee); id. at 246 (lay combinations); id. at 234 
(champerty); id. at 173–200 (advertising, solicit, touting). 
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“all hazards to avoid stirring up strife.”51  It seeks, “in short, to 
commercialize instead of professionalize the practice of the law.”52 
The solution for Cohen was formal regulation by the organized bar 
to restore the profession’s commitment to what he variously calls 
“our social conscience,”53 “social service,”54 the traditional duties of 
“an officer of the court,”55 the “guild ideal,”56 and “its sense of fealty 
to court, to client and to community.”57  Formal regulation, Cohen 
insists, must be designed and implemented by the bar,58 and it should 
concentrate on practices that appear irretrievably “commercial” in 
nature (such as advertising and contingency fees) as well as erecting 
entry barriers (including heightened educational prerequisites and 
regulating unauthorized practice) to discourage and exclude those 
who would approach the practice of law with baser motives.59  The 
elite twentieth century bar attempted to hold precisely this regulatory 
line.60 
Cohen was not naïve about the intersection between law and 
business.  Lawyers might use what they learned in law practice to 
become business executives, and any sensible lawyer would take 
advantage of business principles to efficiently manage his law office.61  
But business principles could not be allowed to define the attorney-
client relationship or the standards of practice that shaped it.  
“[C]ommercial standards” were simply anathema to “the standards of 
 
 51. Id. at 238. 
 52. Id. at 243. 
 53. Id. at 144. 
 54. Id. at 146, 213, 243. 
 55. Id. at 42. 
 56. Id. at 127. 
 57. Id. at 243. 
 58. Id. at 22–23 (“[The capacity to] purg[e] the profession of those who fall below 
the standards of the profession itself . . . is made possible by reason of the Court’s 
inherent jurisdiction over lawyers.  It is because of the lawyer’s position as an officer 
of the Court that the disciplinary process is made practicable.  Destroy the 
conception of the Bar as a profession—as a branch of the judicial system, and you at 
once remove the basis upon which the lawyer may be brought to prompt and 
summary accountability.  Take away the conception of the practice of law as a 
profession—make it a business—and at once you destroy the very basis of 
professional discipline.”).  
 59. Also employ training in ethics, establish ethics committees, control exit via 
disbarment, and impose discipline. See id. at Book II; see also id. at 141 (“Education 
for the Bar must include moral training . . . .”). 
 60. See supra Part I. 
 61. COHEN, supra note 37, at 210–11. 
SPAULDING_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2013  10:22 PM 
2012] PRACTICE OF LAW AS A USEFUL ART 443 
our profession.”62  The elite twentieth century bar was equally 
committed to this view of professionalism, in rhetoric and sentiment, 
if not in actual practice.63 
III.  THE ABSENT OBJECT OF NOSTALGIA AND OTHER 
ANACHRONISMS 
What are we to make of the fact that, at least as early as the 1830s, 
Jacksonian populists thought the profession had already sacrificed 
professionalism on the altar of profit and that the practice of law 
needed radical, democratic reform?  Indeed, the charge of 
commercialization belonged, successively, to antebellum populists 
who sought to make the legal profession more accessible and 
democratically accountable by eliminating entry barriers;64 Whig-
Federalist and mid-Victorian elites who turned to an ideology of 
professionalism to counter the populists;65 twentieth century bar 
leaders who drew upon that ideology to justify formal professional 
organization and disciplinary power; and of course to nearly all 
current critics of the profession—post-functionalist, populist, neo-
Marxist, Kantian, and otherwise—who see an all too convenient 
contradiction in the relationship between professional ideology and 
professional organization.66  If there was no period in which the bar 
was immune from the charge of commercialization and anxiety about 
it, how do we explain the remarkably consistent conjunction of 
nostalgia and crisis rhetoric among elite lawyers? 
The nostalgia of Fisher and Cohen has a strategic valence and 
effect, even if it is, in each case, thoroughly sincere.  It strips 
disfavored behavior in the present of authority and aligns 
professional ideals with a privileged past to lend credibility to reform 
measures that conflate lawyers’ self-interest and the public interest.  
But the nostalgic moment, or more precisely, its object, is almost 
always misplaced—a kind of anachronism—for there was never an 
antecedent moment of pure professional integrity to recover.67  The 
 
 62. Id. at 215.  Indeed, respectable businesses should adopt the standards of the 
professions. Id. at 42–43. 
 63. See supra Part I. 
 64. See Grayson, supra note 43; Spaulding, supra note 31. 
 65. BLEDSTEIN, supra note 20; Norman W. Spaulding, The Discourse of Law in 
Time of War: Politics and Professionalism During the Civil War and Reconstruction, 
46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2001 (2005). 
 66. See supra note 4. 
 67. Just as there was never an antecedent period in which morally activist or civic 
republican norms dominated American law practice. See generally Norman W. 
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object of nostalgic recollection is instead the collective conditions of 
practice in which lawyers in the present imagine that they would have 
thrived without having to compromise principle for profit.68  As 
Cohen’s references to the lawyer in “Republican Rome” (who 
“rendered service for his client gratuitously”)69 and the treatment of a 
fee as a mere “honorarium” in seventeenth century England suggest,70 
the ultimate object of nostalgic recollection is a patrician ideal.  It is 
the status of noblemen and wealthy, landed gentry for whom the 
practice of law was, if not a mere pastime or diversion, a calling 
almost entirely independent of the need to make a living.  But the 
material conditions for this patrician ideal never existed for most 
American lawyers.71  And as Cohen acknowledges, even when those 
conditions did exist, compensation for services rendered still became 
the norm and lawyers were accused of demanding “excessive fees.”72 
The anti-democratic element of the elite bar’s concept of 
professionalism is equally anachronistic.  Whatever the prejudices of 
the elite bar, American lawyers were never a recognizably discrete 
social class.  Running well into the colonial period, the practice of law 
was occupied, if not dominated, by “climbers.”73  We have always 
 
Spaulding, The Myth of Civic Republicanism: Interrogating the Ideology of 
Antebellum Legal Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1397 (2003). 
 68. I think it is surpassingly difficult to argue that the rhetoric of crisis is instead to 
be explained by a gradually and yet inexorably increasing degree of commercial 
rapacity.  The material conditions of commercialism and greed have shifted, but not 
the temptation.  There are, for instance, striking parallels in the practices of lawyers 
involved in debt collection after the American Revolution, railroad lawyers in the 
mid- and late nineteenth century, and M&A lawyers in the 1980s. See SZATMARY, 
supra note 44; WILLIAM G. THOMAS, LAWYERING FOR THE RAILROAD: BUSINESS, 
LAW, AND POWER IN THE NEW SOUTH (1999); Grayson, supra note 43; see also 
BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF AMERICAN 
INDEPENDENCE (2002); James A. Henretta, The “Market” in the Early Republic, 18 
J. EARLY AM. REPUB. 289 (1998); Thomas D. Russell, The Antebellum Courthouse 
as Creditors’ Domain: Trial-Court Activity in South Carolina and the Concomitance 
of Lending and Litigation, 40 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 331 (1996). 
 69. COHEN, supra note 37, at 202. 
 70. Id. at 201. 
 71. There are examples of early American lawyers who came from landed gentry, 
see ANTON HERMAN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 
(1965); GERARD W. GAWALT, THE PROMISE OF POWER: THE EMERGENCE OF THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1760-1840 (1979), but for the most part law 
was a middle class calling and a vehicle for upward social mobility. See FRIEDMAN, 
supra note 44.   
 72. COHEN, supra note 37, at 202–03. 
 73. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 44, at 305 (“In fact, the doors to the profession 
were at all times relatively open.  Control over admission to the bar was loose, to say 
the least. Legal education was not very stringent. The bar became a great avenue of 
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been, as Lawrence Friedman once trenchantly observed, a “nimble” 
profession.74  And while Cohen concentrates the blame for 
commercialization on lawyers without formal training and lawyers 
representing consumers and employees, until quite recently, the 
greatest lucre in the profession was reserved for the highly trained, 
elite lawyers who cleared and maintained the legal paths for the 
expansion of corporate and industrial capitalism.75 
Nor is it the case, as I have argued elsewhere at some length, that 
lawyers in the antebellum period were bereft of professional 
standards of conduct or free from professional regulation.76  There 
was a law of lawyering, professional ethics were hotly debated in law 
magazines and public speeches, judges regulated admission to the bar 
(albeit with varying degrees of rigor), and even in states that 
eliminated judicial control over admission, judges retained control 
over disbarment.77  It is a measure of the changes wrought by the 
project of formal professional organization envisioned by Cohen and 
his mid-Victorian predecessors (as well as the pedagogic innovations 
of Christopher Columbus Langdell) that we have largely forgotten 
this history of alternatives to regulation by mandatory bar 
associations and training in law schools. 
Reading Cohen from a twenty-first century vantage, perhaps the 
most striking anachronism in The Law: Business or Profession? is its 
remove from the modernist movement of the early 1900s.  In 1915, 
 
social advancement.”); id. at 635 (“[As late as the Gilded Age,] the private lawyer 
kept his independent status as a middle-class craftsman and entrepreneur . . . .  The 
upper echelons of the profession never quite succeeded in closing the doors against 
newcomers and outsiders.”); Maxwell Bloomfield, Law vs. Politics: The Self-Image of 
the American Bar (1830-1860), 12 AM. J. LEGAL. HIST. 306, 313–14 (1968); cf. id. at 
305–06 (“The bar was open to almost everybody . . . but this did not mean that there 
were no barriers of class or background . . . .  Studies have shown that lawyers from 
wealthy backgrounds are far more likely to reach the heights than lawyers from 
working-class homes. . . .  Some of the best, most famous lawyers came up the hard 
way; but all in all, good social background was important then too.”). 
 74. FRIEDMAN, supra note 44, at 634 (“The truth was that the profession was 
exceedingly nimble at finding new kinds of work and new ways to do it.  Its 
nimbleness was no doubt due to the character of the bar: open-ended, unrestricted, 
uninhibited, attractive to sharp, ambitious men.”). 
 75. Gordon, The Ideal and the Actual in the Law, supra note 30; Gordon, Legal 
Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise, in PROFESSIONS AND 
PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA (Geison ed., 1983); MAGALI SARFATTI 
LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1977). 
 76. See Norman W. Spaulding, The Privilege of Probity: Forgotten Foundations 
of the Attorney Client Privilege, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS (forthcoming 2013); 
Spaulding, supra note 67. 
 77. See Spaulding, supra note 67, at 1425. 
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Paul Strand shot his famous photograph of the shadowy, astylar 
exterior the “House of Morgan” at 23 Wall Street dwarfing the 
pedestrians on the adjacent sidewalk.78  By 1914, Picasso had 
developed the “new figurative language” of cubism, “which replaced 
traditional perspective” by deconstructing three-dimensional space 
“into facets that merged and penetrated each other.”79  Cubists, as 
Peter Gay describes, “were intent on making works of art that would 
not let the viewer forget their distinct essence as human products. 
They shattered surfaces that in nature belong together and 
reassembled fragmented reality . . . giving the viewer the chore of 
putting the fragments together into a recognizable semblance of 
actuality.”80  In “The Man in a Bowler Hat” (1915), Picasso applies 
this technique of “analytical deconstruction” to reveal the “grotesque 
characteristics of a middle-class man . . . corseted in a tightly buttoned 
jacket, with a self-satisfied smile.”81  In the same year a Chicago 
literary journal published T.S. Eliot’s poem “The Love Song of J. 
Alfred Prufrock;”82 James Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young 
Man was published a year later.83  Sigmund Freud had already 
published, inter alia, Totem and Taboo (1913), Three Essays on the 
Theory of Sexuality (1905), Jokes and Their Relation to the 
Unconscious (1905), and The Interpretation of Dreams (1899).  
Stravinsky’s “thumping, static . . . nerve-wracking,” and thoroughly 
“anti-romantic[]” score for The Rites of Spring premiered in Paris in 
1913.84  Schoenberg premiered his “breathtakingly unconventional” 
exploration of atonality in the Second String Quartet in Vienna 
1909.85  And Frank Lloyd Wright’s “radical innovation” in domestic 
architecture began at the turn of the century.86  Gay observes that 
“[t]he disputes common among Victorian builders and their clients 
about which historical style, Greek or Venetian or Renaissance, was 
superior to its rivals . . . struck Wright, along with other modernists, as 
 
 78. ROBERT M. CRUNDEN, BODY AND SOUL: THE MAKING OF AMERICAN 
MODERNISM: ART, MUSIC AND LETTERS IN THE JAZZ AGE 1919-1926, at  59 (2000). 
 79. PICASSO: THE MONOGRAPH, 1881-1973, at 12, 140 (Léal ed., 2009). 
 80. PETER GAY, MODERNISM: THE LURE OF HERESY 155 (2008). 
 81. See PICASSO: THE MONOGRAPH, supra note 79, at 140, 181. 
 82. T.S. Eliot, The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock, in POETRY: A MAGAZINE OF 
VERSE 130 (1915). 
 83. JAMES JOYCE, A PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST AS A YOUNG MAN (1916).  
 84. GAY, supra note 80, at 259. 
 85. Id. at 247-50. 
 86. Id. at 288. 
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a reactionary escape from living in the present, a betrayal of their 
craft.”87 
For all the concern of proponents of the culture of professionalism 
with the specter of commercialization, with what Cohen called the 
need for “[r]adical reorganization of the American Bar,”88 and with 
forcing out the “little devils” of inconsistency “in every corner of our 
professional life,”89 the end product in ideals and regulatory practices 
was not merely restrained by nostalgia bordering on escapism and 
anti-democratic sentiment; it was remarkably complacent.  All the 
more so in contrast to modernists of the same period in the visual 
arts, architecture, music, and psychology, who sought to break 
decisively from bourgeois values, to openly challenge “conventional 
sensibilities,” and to cultivate a “principled self-scrutiny.”90  If, in 
retrospect, the fields in which modernists worked seem free of the 
kinds of responsibilities lawyers shoulder, it is worth recalling that 
artists have had no less complex and delicate a balance to strike 
between professional autonomy and the demands of client patronage, 
no less a struggle with the lure of commercialization in an era of mass 
markets and “inexpensive reproductive techniques.”91  From this 
perspective, the bar’s handwringing about sacrificing principle to 
profit in the twentieth century seems just like what post-functionalists 
called it: proof of surrender to bourgeois commercialism dressed up 
as steadfast resistance. 
IV.  THE MODERNIST TURN: LAW AS A USEFUL ART 
If Cohen and his cohort can be forgiven for missing or ignoring the 
spirit of modernism, we twenty-first century lawyers cannot.  More 
than ever, we need a modernist commitment to witheringly 
“principled self-scrutiny.”  And that commitment would have to be 
shared by the bar’s internal critics, especially those in the legal 
academy, who are largely removed from the demands of practice and 
appear to be as attached to the “conventional sensibilities” of 
criticism as the bar has been to its protectionist project. 
Modernism drew the Enlightenment theory of subjectivity into 
doubt.  Yet no theory or critique of professionalism takes the 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. COHEN, supra note 37, at 155. 
 89. Id. at 212. 
 90. GAY, supra note 80, at 3–4. 
 91. Id. at 17–27; see also WALTER BENJAMIN, THE WORK OF ART IN AN AGE OF 
MECHANICAL REPRODUCTION (Prism Key Press 2010) (1936). 
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decentered subject depicted in Picasso’s cubism and Freud’s 
psychology seriously as a problem for the attorney-client 
relationship.92  And while some legal theorists have made the realist 
turn and taken doctrinal indeterminacy as well as the biases of class, 
race, and gender seriously, the urge to rescue the fractured 
foundations of traditional legal principles all too often proves 
irresistible.93  Indeed, reform projects can entrench the very biases 
and resistance they seek to overcome.  As Wendy Brown poignantly 
observes: 
While the effort to replace liberalism’s abstract formulation of 
equality with legal recognition of injurious social stratifications is 
understandable, what such arguments do not query is whether legal 
“protection” for a certain injury-forming identity discursively 
entrenches the injury-identity connection it denounces.  Might such 
protection codify within the law the very powerlessness it aims to 
redress?94 
Legal ethicists, for their part, have generally clung to neo-Kantian 
and consequentialist moral arguments notwithstanding devastating 
critiques elaborated by modern philosophers,95 and notwithstanding 
the overwhelming evidence of moral pluralism in our society, and 
thus in the clients American lawyers represent.96  In the practice of 
law, finally, dispute resolution procedures increasingly demand 
“enclosed” spaces in which efficiency, order, secrecy, rationality, and 
elite control are privileged over participation, transparency, and the 
 
 92. Problems of collective identity and collective action have received some 
attention. See DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 209, 237 (2007).  
On the problem of the decentered subject for law, see Norman W. Spaulding, The 
Historical Consciousness of the Resistant Subject, 1 IRVINE L. REV. 677 (2011). 
 93. In this respect, I agree with David Luban that Critical Legal Studies scholars 
and other critical legal theorists are “alone aware of the modernist predicament in 
the contemporary legal context.” DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 40 (1994) 
(emphasis added).  I would not, however, classify these theorists as modernist so 
much as neo-Realist and neo-Marxist.   
 94. WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE 
MODERNITY 21 (1995); see also id. at 27. 
 95. See BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1973-1980 
(1981); BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM, FOR AND AGAINST (1973); BERNARD 
WILLIAMS, MORALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS 9 (1972) (“Most moral 
philosophy at most times has been empty and boring . . . .”); FREDRICH NIETZSCHE, 
ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS (Douglas Smith trans., Oxford Univ. Pub. 2007) 
(1887). 
 96. See Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting Professional Identity, 74 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 1 (2003); Norman W. Spaulding, The Rule of Law in Action: A Defense of 
Adversary System Values, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1377, 1389 (2008).  
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passionate, dynamic features of adversarial exchange.97  Procedural 
enclosure thus now complements the bar’s protectionist enclosure of 
access to law. 
Instead of seeking to ground professional authority in the 
conjunction of knowledge, autonomy, prestige, and “crisis” central to 
the mid-Victorian and twentieth century project of 
professionalization, a modernist concept of professionalism might 
begin from the more humble premise that law is simply one of the 
useful arts.  Like other practitioners of the useful arts, lawyers would 
have to release their sentimental attachment to anachronistic 
concepts of craftsmanship—the guild ideal and its patrician 
integument—along with priggishness about the material aspects of 
producing useful art.  Modernists expressed their acute sensitivity to 
the material aspects of production in the figure of “the Machine.”  As 
Frank Lloyd Wright described in his 1901 speech to the Chicago 
Architectural Club,  
the Machine has dealt Art, in the grand old sense a death blow . . . .  
Art in the grand old sense—meaning Art in the sense of structural 
tradition, whose craft is fashioned upon the handicraft ideal, ancient 
or modern, an art wherein this form and that form as structural parts 
were laboriously joined in such a way as to beautifully emphasize 
the manner of the joining . . . .98   
Wright was objecting most immediately to the persistence of the 
overwrought English Arts and Crafts style and the fundamental 
dishonesty of neoclassicism, which relied upon but concealed the use 
of steel and other machined materials.99  But more broadly, he 
rejected the anxiety of architects of his time about whether the 
mechanized production capacities of the industrial revolution posed a 
mortal threat to architecture—anxiety that mechanization was “a 
terrible engine of enslavement, deluging the civilized world with a 
murderous ubiquity, which plainly enough was the damnation of their 
art and craft.”100  While his peers were caught up in the nostalgic 
rhetoric of decline, lamentation, and exhortation, he admonished, 
“invincible, triumphant, the machine goes on, gathering force and 
knitting the material necessities of mankind ever closer into a 
 
 97. Spaulding, supra note 25. 
 98. Frank Lloyd Wright, Speech to Chicago Architectural Club (1901), reprinted 
in FRANK LLOYD WRIGHT COLLECTED WRITINGS 1894-1930, at 58–60 (Bruce Brooks 
Pfeiffer ed., 1992). 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. at 59. 
SPAULDING_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2013  10:22 PM 
450 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
universal automatic fabric, the engine, the motor, and the battleship, 
the works of art of the century!”101 
Indeed, in the machine, Wright saw nothing less than “the great 
forerunner of Democracy” and “the only future” for architecture.102 
[W]e insist now upon a basis of Democracy.  Is it not more likely 
that the medium of artistic expression itself has broadened and 
changed until a new definition and new direction must be given the 
art-activity of the future, and that the Machine has finally made for 
the artist, whether he will yet own it or not, a splendid distinction 
between the Art of old and the Art to come?  A distinction made by 
the tool which frees human labor, lengthens and broadens the life of 
the simplest man, thereby the basis of the Democracy upon which 
we insist.103 
Wright was not denying the abuses of Gilded Age industrial 
capitalism, but rather straining to see ahead of them and locate an 
emancipatory potential within the material conditions created by 
them.  As importantly, he insisted upon “the utter helplessness of old 
forms to satisfy new conditions” and he rebuked his colleagues who 
were “clinging sadly to the old order” and “feeling only—when they 
feel at all—that what is most truly like the past is the safest and 
therefore the best.”104  The architect who could overcome the 
anachronisms of his craft was, in Wright’s view, uniquely positioned 
to exploit the “pliant,” “plastic,” and highly efficient capacities of 
machine production to meet “man’s spiritual and material needs 
without waste, within reach of all.”105 
That Wright’s own architecture is so thoroughly modern and yet 
deeply connected both to nature and the functional, accessible use of 
 
 101. Id. at 61. 
 102. Id. at 59.  Wright was not the only modernist who celebrated the capacity of 
the machine. See GAY, supra note 80, at 305 (quoting Le Corbusier’s famous 
statement that “A house is a machine for living in.”); see also BENJAMIN, supra note 
91. Compare LEWIS MUMFORD, TECHNICS AND CIVILIZATION (1934), with LEWIS 
MUMFORD, THE MYTH OF THE MACHINE: THE PENTAGON OF POWER (1970). 
 103. Wright, supra note 98, at 61–62. 
 104. Id. at 62–63. 
 105. Id. at 62, 65; GAY, supra note 80, at 293; Frank Lloyd Wright, Modern 
Architecture, Being the Kahn Lectures, in THE ESSENTIAL FRANK LLOYD WRIGHT: 
CRITICAL WRITINGS ON ARCHITECTURE 169 (Bruce Brooks Pfeiffer ed. 2008) 
(“Rightly used the very curse machinery puts upon handicraft should emancipate the 
artist from temptation to petty structural deceit and end this wearisome struggle to 
make things seem what they are not and can never be.  Then the machine itself, 
eventually, will satisfy the simple terms of its modern art equation as the ball of clay 
in the sculptor’s hand yields to his desire—ending forever this nostalgic masquerade 
led by a stultified culture in the name of art.”). 
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space draws into relief the extent to which he was not caught up in 
any naïve or radical futurism.  “Simplicity in art,” which Wright 
thought the machine could “teach” the modern architect, “is a 
synthetic, positive quality, in which we may see evidence of mind, 
breadth of scheme, wealth of detail, and withal a sense of 
completeness found in a tree or a flower . . . .  A thing to be simple 
needs only to be true to itself in organic sense.”106  And lest we take 
too parochial a view of what Wright meant by mechanization, it is 
worth emphasizing that he saw office buildings and even cities as 
machines.107  Indeed, in the interconnected structural attributes of 
cities he predicted that machines would “weav[e] a web of 
intercommunication so far-reaching that distance becomes as nothing, 
the thought of one man in one corner of the earth one day visible to 
the naked eye of all men the next.”108  Finally, Wright’s concept of 
architecture as a useful art abjures not only sentimentalism, nostalgia, 
and all “affectation,”109 but also the base modernist impulse merely to 
épater la bourgeoisie as well as the anti-democratic elitism of 
modernists who believed their only legitimate audience was 
insiders.110  To practice a useful art, on his account, is to put expertise 
in the service of human needs for democratic ends—“without waste, 
within reach of all.”111 
What is the law if not a machinery of government?  Machinery is, 
after all, precisely what the framers of the constitution believed they 
were creating.  As Michael Kammen has reminded us: 
The most common way of referring to the Constitution—the oldest 
as well as the most enduring—is simply as an “instrument” . . . .  In 
1774 Jefferson’s Summary View [of the Rights of British America] 
 
 106. Wright, supra note 98, at 64. 
 107. Id. at 68–69. 
 108. Id. at 69. 
 109. Id. at 64. 
 110. GAY, supra note 80, at 23–24. 
 111. There is of course much to criticize in Frank Lloyd Wright, the person, and in 
the profession of architecture.  I intend no endorsement of either.  If it has less 
frequently framed its challenges in the language of “crisis,” architecture, as a 
profession, nevertheless faces daunting twenty-first century challenges. See Kelly 
Minner, What Will the Architecture Profession Look Like in 2025?, ARCH DAILY 
(Nov. 4, 2012, 11:51 AM), http://www.archdaily.com/118441/what-will-the-
architecture-profession-look-like-in-2025/.  On Frank Lloyd Wright’s personal 
failings, particularly his well-documented lack of humility, see ADA LOUISE 
HUXTABLE, FRANK LLOYD WRIGHT: A LIFE (2008).  My point is simply that the legal 
profession has too long delayed engagement with forms of modernism that 
profoundly affected other useful arts, and likely would improve its self-
understanding, its public image, as well as the pleasures of practice.   
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mentioned “the great machine of government”; and in 1775 John 
Adams described the British imperial constitution as a vast but 
broken mechanism: “the great machine will not go any longer 
without a new wheel.” . . .  During the Convention held at 
Philadelphia in 1787, however, delegates referred to the “admirable 
mechanism of the English Constitution.”  It is scarcely surprising, 
therefore, that during the debates over ratification in 1787-88, 
Federalists and Anti-Federalists occasionally discussed the newly 
drafted Constitution in these terms.112 
Eric Slauter has extended Kammen’s analysis, revealing the extent to 
which the framers understood their work “by analogy to 
architecture,” and thus the rule of law itself as “a work of art.”113  
“The transition from the Articles of Confederation to the 
Constitution,” he writes, “was regularly figured in contemporary 
rhetoric and imagery as the abandonment of an ‘impotent’ Congress 
and the ‘erection’ of a new piece of architecture, an edifice designed 
to shelter the law and liberties of the United States.”114 
What follows for professional regulation from the idea that the 
practice of law is a useful art?  Most importantly, principled self-
scrutiny should expose the embarrassingly pervasive gaps between 
right and remedy for actual professional misconduct in the service of 
clients.  There is currently no meaningful remedy for many common 
types of breach of professional duty.  In civil matters, the cost of 
malpractice litigation, including contingency fees, can preclude 
malpractice liability as a remedy;115 woefully inadequate resources for 
investigation and under-enforcement of misconduct complaints to bar 
disciplinary authorities diminish the risk of professional discipline for 
 
 112. MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE 
CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE 16–18 (1986). 
 113. ERIC SLAUTER, THE STATE AS A WORK OF ART: THE CULTURAL ORIGINS OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 63–64 (2009). 
 114. Id. at 63; see also Letter from Abraham Lincoln, President of the United 
States, to Thurlow Weed (Dec. 17, 1860) (“[N]o state can, in any lawful way, get out 
of the Union, without the consent of the others; and . . . it is the duty of the President, 
and other functionaries to run the machine as it is.”). 
 115. See Jack Smart, An Attorney’s Fee Provision May Not Be A Good Idea, 42 
ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 34 (2000) (“It’s not uncommon for California attorneys to 
advise the clients who have claims between $5,000 and $50,000 that it is not 
economically wise to pursue litigation.”); Jeffery Badgley, Legal Malpractice and 
Florida Foreclosure Attorneys, FLA. LEGAL MALPRACTICE (May 22, 2011), 
http://www.floridalegalmalpractice.blogspot.com/2011/05/legal-malpractice-and-
florida.html (saying that for many homeowners who feel their lawyer committed 
malpractice, the costs of a lawsuit outweigh the possible recovery); cf. ABA PROFILE 
OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 2004-2007 (2008) (figures on size and number of 
claims).  
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bad lawyers;116 what little professional discipline is imposed is marred 
by disproportionate enforcement against solo practitioners and 
inadequate enforcement against large firms;117 the increasingly 
pervasive use of limited liability partnerships in law firm organization 
not only restricts recovery in malpractice cases, it also likely reduces 
intra-firm monitoring for misconduct;118 and in many states, courts 
 
 116. Of 118,054 complaints received in 2010, 44,814 were never investigated and 
only 3,791 resulted in public sanctions. 2010 Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems, 
ABA CENTER FOR PROF. RESP. STANDING COMMITTEE ON PROF. DISCIPLINE (Mar. 
2012), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_ 
responsibility/2010_sold_finalreport.authcheckdam.pdf; see also Fred C. Zacharias, 
What Lawyers Do When Nobody’s Watching: Legal Advertising as a Case Study of 
the Impact of Underenforced Professional Rules, 87 IOWA L. REV. 971 (2002); 
Matthew J. Nasuti, Letter to the Editor, CAL. LAW., Feb. 1992, at 10 (expressing 
outrage at California State Bar’s failure to disbar lawyers for egregious professional 
misconduct); David E. Johnson, Permanent Disbarment: The Case For..., PROF. 
LAW., Feb. 1994, at 22 (noting that in only six states is disbarment even potentially 
permanent).  
 117. With respect to malpractice liability, there is only slight disproportionality in 
the number of suits brought against solo practitioners versus lawyers in large firms.  
As the ABA has observed, “although 70% of lawyers are either solo practitioners or 
in firms of less than ten attorneys, 80% of the claims are filed against them.  14% of 
lawyers in the U.S. practice in firms that are greater than 100 lawyers, but only 8% of 
the claims are filed against them.” ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYERS’ 
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS: 2004-2007, at 
6–7 (2008). Note, however, that these figures do not include claims against lawyers 
who fail to carry malpractice insurance, many of whom are likely to be small firm or 
solo practitioners.  With respect to disproportionality in bar disciplinary proceedings, 
concern over the issue became so high in California in the late 1990s that California 
passed BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6035.1, which required the State Bar to gather statistics 
to ensure that the prosecution of complaints against differently sized firms aligned 
with the proportion of complaints.  The report did find statistically significant 
discrepancies in prosecution rates, though the State Bar argued that this was due to 
structural factors rather than institutional bias on their part. STATE BAR OF CAL., 
INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF DISCIPLINARY COMPLAINTS AGAINST 
ATTORNEYS IN SOLO PRACTICE, SMALL LAW FIRMS AND LARGE SIZE LAW FIRMS 
(2001).  An earlier California study found that 50% of sanctioned attorneys were solo 
practitioners although solo practitioners compose only 29% of the state’s bar. See 
ROBERT FELLMETH, FIFTH PROGRESS REPORT OF THE STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY 
MONITOR (1989); Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1, 11 (1991) (arguing that the structure of the disciplinary model is difficult to 
enforce against large law firms, resulting in disproportionate impact on solo and small 
firm practitioners); James Evans, Lawyers at Risk, CAL. LAW., Oct. 1989, at 45–47. 
 118. ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON 
PARTNERSHIP § 3.04(b) (2008); see also Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The 
Economics of Limited Liability: An Empirical Study of New York Law Firms, 2005 
U. ILL. L. REV. 107; Susan Saab Fortney, Professional Responsibility and Liability 
Issues Related to Limited Liability Law Partnerships, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 399 (1998) 
(discussing the history of the rise of LLP’s in response to liability exposure of general 
partnerships after the savings and loan scandal); Susan Saab Fortney, Tales of Two 
Regimes for Regulating Limited Liability Law Firms in the U.S. and Australia: Client 
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have equivocated about the relevance of the bar’s own rules of 
professional conduct (including evidence of breach of these rules) to 
malpractice liability.119  In criminal matters the federal constitutional 
standard for ineffective assistance of counsel in criminal cases is 
shockingly lax,120 and malpractice liability is not only exceedingly 
difficult to establish, in some states a cause of action against the 
lawyer is only available where the plaintiff can prove she was 
innocent of the charges in the underlying criminal case.121 
 
Protection and Risk Management Lessons, 11 LEGAL ETHICS 230 (2009); Martin C. 
McWilliams, Jr., Who Bears the Costs of Lawyers’ Mistakes? Against Limited 
Liability, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 885 (2004). 
 119. See Smith v. Haynsworth, Marion, McKay & Geurard, 472 S.E.2d 612, 614 
(S.C. 1996) (following “the majority of jurisdictions” in allowing evidence of breach 
of the rules of professional conduct in a malpractice action only where the Bar Rule 
is “intended to protect a person in the plaintiff’s position or . . . addressed to the 
particular harm”); id. at 614 n.6 (“[T]he failure to comply with the [Rules of 
Professional Conduct] should not . . . be considered as evidence of negligence per se.  
It is merely a circumstance that, along with other facts and circumstances, may be 
considered in determining whether the attorney acted with reasonable care in 
fulfilling his legal duties to a client.”); Hizey v. Carpenter, 830 P.2d 646, 654 (Wash. 
1992) (holding that a jury may not be informed of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
either in expert testimony or jury instructions); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’ 
CONDUCT Preamble and Scope (2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/ 
groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduc
t/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_preamble_scope.html (“Violation of a Rule 
should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer nor should it create any 
presumption in such a case that a legal duty has been breached.”); Ann Peters, The 
Model Rules as a Guide for Legal Malpractice, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 609, 616–17 
(1993) (stating that many courts have declined to use the Model Rules as evidence of 
the duty of care). 
 120. See Hargrave-Thomas v. Yukins, 374 F.3d 383, 391 (6th Cir. 2004) (Clay, C.J., 
dissenting) (denying a new trial on procedural grounds despite a district court’s 
finding that counsel had provided “manifestly and flagrantly” ineffective assistance in 
being too “cocky” to interview any potential witnesses or conduct an investigation 
before trial); Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 349 (5th Cir. 2001) (declining to 
adopt a per se rule that any dozing by the defense counsel during the trial merits a 
presumption of prejudice); see also Eve Brensike Primus, The Illusory Right to 
Counsel, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 597 (2011) (summarizing the current law on the right 
to counsel and describing the numerous gaps that have deprived defendants of the 
opportunity to win relief for ineffective assistance of counsel); Jenny Roberts, 
Proving Prejudice, Post-Padilla, 54 HOW. L.J. 693, 712–19 (2011) (highlighting how 
difficult it has become to prove prejudice in criminal ineffective assistance of counsel 
cases).  
 121. See Wiley v. Cnty. of San Diego, 966 P.2d 983, 991 (Cal. 1998) (ruling that 
although the plaintiff’s underlying conviction for battery had been overturned, the 
court held he was barred from bringing a malpractice suit unless he could prove 
actual innocence); Peeler v. Huges & Luce, 909 S.W.2d 494, 495 (Tex. 1995) (holding 
that malpractice suit based on the attorney’s failure to convey an offer for full 
immunity was barred because the plaintiff had pled guilty to the crime); Ang v. 
Martin, 114 P.3d 637, 643 (Wash. 2005) (holding that plaintiffs who had been fully 
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On the other hand, in many areas where no client can be heard to 
complain of misconduct, rights are overbroad and remedies are over-
enforced.  Two of the most prominent examples are unauthorized 
practice statutes and the judicial remedy of disqualification for 
conflicts of interest.  Unauthorized practice laws are embarrassingly 
over-inclusive and, for the most part, indifferent to the interests of the 
consumers of legal services they purport to protect.  Courts asked to 
enforce unauthorized practice statutes by a state bar generally do not 
even consider whether the service rendered by the non-lawyer was 
competent.  The typical plaintiff is not an injured consumer, but 
rather the state bar’s committee charged with ferreting out and 
deterring non-lawyer competition for legal services in the state. 122 
Judicial over-enforcement of conflicts of interests via the 
disqualification remedy has reached nearly epidemic proportions.  
One study identified a sixfold increase in disqualification claims 
between the 1970s and 1990s.123  Some of the fault lies with 
overzealous lawyers seeking the tactical advantage of disqualifying an 
opponent’s lawyer of choice.  However, by taking a prophylactic 
approach to conflicts analysis, courts have invited tactical abuse of the 
remedy.  As Bruce Green has explained, in some cases 
disqualification serves a proper “remedial function” by protecting “a 
 
acquitted at trial still could not bring a malpractice claim unless they could 
affirmatively prove that they were actually innocent of the charges); see also Kevin 
Bennardo, Note, A Defense Bar: The “Proof of Innocence” Requirement in Criminal 
Malpractice Claims, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 341 (2007) (arguing that the current 
standard for criminal malpractice cases—legal innocence and actual innocence—is 
unreasonable). 
 122. For an example of judicial complicity in over-enforcement of unauthorized 
practice laws, see Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., No. 
Civ. A. 3:97CV-2859H, 1999 WL 47235 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 1999), vacated, 179 F.3d 
956 (5th Cir. 1999). See also Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: 
A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 
STAN. L. REV. 1, 81 (1981) (“Not only is the legal knowledge definition inclusive to 
the point of absurdity, but it is only tenuously related to concerns regarding 
competence. Members of other occupational groups, such as accountants, real estate 
brokers, insurance agents, and bankers, will often be more familiar with controlling 
law in their respective specialties than the average attorney.”). 
 123. Kenneth L. Penegar, The Loss of Innocence: A Brief History of Law Firm 
Disqualification in the Courts, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 831, 889 (1995); see also Leah 
Epstein, Comment, A Balanced Approach to Mandamus Review of Attorney 
Disqualification Orders, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 667, 668 (2005) (noting that the 
opportunities for disqualification motions are greater now with the increased size of 
firms and thus the increased likelihood of conflicts). 
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present or former client from the risks posed by a lawyer’s conflict of 
interest.”124 
In other cases, however, disqualification seems unnecessary or 
inappropriate as a remedy, because the risks posed by the lawyer’s 
conflict of interest are slight or because those risks seem to be 
acceptable ones in light of the countervailing harms that 
disqualification would cause both to the court and to the litigant 
who would be deprived of the chosen lawyer’s services.125 
Indifference to this distinction has led to disqualifications in cases 
where no client can rightfully complain that her current or former 
lawyer has failed to protect interests legitimately arising from the 
representation.126   
 Modernist simplicity and honesty demand closing these right-
remedy gaps. As importantly, if law is a machinery of government in a 
democratic society the legal profession should seek to maximize 
access to law, not maximize monopoly rents.  We must, with Wright, 
“insist upon” rather than resist “a basis in Democracy” for our 
profession.  There is lucre enough, indeed, vast markets to be tapped, 
in the project of maximizing access.  And machinery, quite literally, 
can aid the endeavor.  County courts in California are now 
developing elaborate software to simplify basic legal filings;127 Legal 
Zoom and other online legal service providers are reshaping the 
market for legal services for middle income Americans;128 the Internet 
 
 124. Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The Judicial Role, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 72 (1996) (calling for a disqualification jurisprudence that is 
“less restrictive and less categorical than the conflict rules”).  
 125. Id.  
 126. See JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 189 F. Supp 2d 20 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); Tessier v. Plastic Surgery Specialists, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. 
Va. 1990); Nathan M. Crystal, Disqualification of Counsel for Unrelated Matter 
Conflicts of Interest, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 273 (1990); Steven H. Goldberg, The 
Former Client’s Disqualification Gambit: A Bad Move in Pursuit of an Ethical 
Anomaly, 72 MINN. L. REV. 227 (1987); James Lindgren, Toward a New Standard of 
Attorney Disqualification, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 421, 432; Thomas D. Morgan, 
Suing a Current Client, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1157 (1996).   
 127. See Online Self-Help Center, CAL. CTS., http://www.courts.ca.gov/ 
selfhelp.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2013). 
 128. See Janson v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (W.D. Mo. 2011) 
(holding that Legal Zoom violated Missouri’s unauthorized practice of law statutes); 
Richard Granat & Marc Lauritsen, The Next Five Years: Predictions for the Future 
of eLawyering, 37 ABA L. PRAC. 42 (2011); Catherine J. Lanctot, Does LegalZoom 
Have First Amendment Rights?: Some Thoughts About Freedom of Speech and the 
Unauthorized Practice of Law, 20 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 255 (2011); 
Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Facebook Disruption: How Social Media May 
Transform Civil Litigation and Facilitate Access to Justice, 65 ARK. L. REV. 75, 84 
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can dramatically reduce information costs for finding and comparing 
lawyers;129 and the class action procedure is a machine for aggregating 
claims that would otherwise never be brought and for concentrating 
the effects of preclusion doctrine in ways that eliminate the repetition 
of claims.130  A properly designed machine can be complex, nimble, 
and user-friendly at the same time.  Like any machine, those designed 
to maximize access to law may be abused, especially where 
transparency is wanting and injured consumers have no meaningful 
remedies.131  But maximizing access is a far more credible foundation 
for the professional authority of lawyers in a democratic society than 
protectionism. 
Closing the right-remedy gap and maximizing access to legal 
services are but two of the most basic reforms that would follow from 
embracing law as a useful art.  To implement them and explore 
others, the profession must finally make the modernist turn. 
 
 
(2012); Ronald W. Staudt, All the Wild Possibilities: Technology that Attacks 
Barriers to Access to Justice, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1117 (2009); Phillip Bantz, 
LegalZoom Awaits Ruling in N.C., Facing Lawsuit in S.C., N.C. LAWS. WKLY., June 
1, 2012; Stephanie Kimbro, Online Legal Services in Shopping Center Kiosks, 
VIRTUAL L. PRAC. (Dec. 12, 2011), http://virtuallawpractice.org/2011/12/virtual-
practice-in-shopping-center-kiosks; Kim Miller, Yes, They’re Real Lawyers: Booth at 
Boynton Mall Peddles Foreclosure Advice, PALM BEACH POST, Dec. 2, 2011, 
available at http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/real-estate/yes-theyre-real-
lawyers-booth-at-boynton-mall-pedd/nLz9J; see also CODEX, http://codex.stanford. 
edu (last visited Feb. 19, 2013).   
 129. See Nora Freeman Engstrom, Attorney Advertising and the Contingency Fee 
Cost Paradox, 65 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013). 
 130. See Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class 
Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337 (1999); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagreda, 
Class Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1649 (2008); Richard A. 
Nagreda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1105 
(2010); cf. Deborah L. Rhode, Instititionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 665, 
723 (1994) (“Current restrictions on subsidizing litigation are frequently evaded, and 
understandably so. If strictly enforced, they would ‘paralyze’ entire categories of 
proceedings, such as class actions and shareholder derivative suits, where no single 
plaintiff has a sufficient stake to accept liability for expenses.”). 
 131. There is also the opportunity for abuse. See, e.g., Nora Freeman Engstrom, 
Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 1485 (2009); Nora Freeman 
Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805 (2011). 
